In Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, his second formulation of the categorical imperative states that we must never treat humanity as a mere means, but as an end-in-itself. Kant himself does not touch on what exactly it means to treat humanity as mere means, so it is left to the reader to conjecture as to what this entails. The distinction between a means and a mere means is realized through three conditions: agreement, proper manners, and a freedom of exit from the agreement.
To begin, it is necessary to recognize that by ‘humanity’ Kant does not mean the human race, but is referring to humanity as a property, that is the ability to set itself ends. It would seem that this doesn’t refer to autonomous functions; those don’t appear to be set by itself. So, it would appear that, “to set itself ends” would involve some sort of conscious deliberation about what to aim at, as autonomous functions, such as the end having of oxygen in our lungs, are not set by oneself, but rather by some (biological) function inherent to their being.
Advancing from the idea of humanity as some sort of conscious deliberation about what one should aim at, let us consider what it would be to use this property as a mere means, rather than an end-in-itself. Kant himself by wording it as mere means, rather than simply means, seems to accept that we do use each other as means quite regularly. This would not seem to be problematic; I use the barista at Starbucks as the means for acquiring a coffee. However, what differentiates my using the barista as a means, from my using them as a mere means? This is what is entirely unclear in Kant’s writings.
Keep in mind that what we are using as a means is the property of being able to set ends. If something or someone does not have this ability, it appears we may be justified in using them as a mere means; however, this won’t be discussed here. When I use the Starbucks barista to get my coffee, I am using their ability to set ends as a means for my own end – by paying money for a coffee, I am imposing my end (i.e. Lucas getting a coffee) on them, so that they direct their means to the satisfaction of my ends.
This doesn’t appear to be a moral atrocity; after all, what could be wrong with a simple transaction such as this? Underlying this transaction is perhaps a necessary, although possibly not sufficient condition of differentiating mere means from means. The Starbucks barista has agreed to serve others ends in which they don’t seem to share in order to satisfy their own ends (i.e. receiving a wage). Thus, it would seem that it is okay to use one as a means, insofar as they are serving their own autonomous end (that is, not the one imposed on them by me) in this interaction.
This agreement to serve as a means however, may not be sufficient. Consider the case of indentured servitude in the early United States. An individual from a poor family could sell themselves into what was essentially slavery in exchange for a lump sum benefit at the outset to help their family pay off debts. Following this, for an agreed upon period of time (typically years), they are the property of their creditor. Appealing to our pre-existing moral sentiments, this seems wrong. It is wrong for one to be reduced to a mere instrument and to have their humanity stripped from them. In this case, the indentured servant is an instrument of their creditor, and loses their humanity insofar as, for the next agreed upon period of time, they have no ends of their own, but only their creditors. In this sense, despite having agreed to this situation, they do seem to have been reduced to a mere means.
Perhaps the distinction here is whether looking forward the agent is having their ends served. In the former case, the barista is having their ends served looking forward as they will be paid for the work they are doing. The indentured servant conversely does not share in this fortune, as they have been paid already, and have no future ends of being paid as the barista does. Could this be the relative moral distinction between being a means and a mere means? Initially it wouldn’t appear so.
Perhaps the relevant distinction exists alongside acceptance, with the recognition of humanity’s dignity. One must not simply agree to serve another’s ends, but in the process, they must be recognized as worthy of respect in virtue of possessing the property of humanity. This does seem to differentiate the cases; the way we look upon a Starbucks employee is evidently different from the way we would look upon an indentured servant. The Starbucks employee is seen as in some sense equal to us, whereas the state of being an indentured servant causes us to look at them as lower.
How is this difference in perception actualized? How do I treat the Starbucks employee that would be different than how I treat an indentured servant? It would seem there must be a distinct difference in treatment in order for them to fall on different sides of the spectrum. Consider how we might treat an indentured servant (or for all intents and purposes, a slave); they are our property and we do not owe them anything (in terms of our agreement). We may simply command them to do something, as in virtue of owning them, they must obey our command. Conversely, we don’t seem to have this some power over a barista. They aren’t under obligation to serve my every command, and through my recognition of this, my treatment differs: namely through what we typically call mannerisms. When ordering from the barista, I preface my order with “may I please get” and conclude it with “thank you”. While this may seem simple, through these mannerisms, I am recognizing their dignity. Humanity is worthy of respect and by not merely commanding them, but recognizing this dignity through proper manners, I am not using them as mere means.
Consider the indentured servant now. Is simply adding “please and thank you” to my commands sufficient to see them not as mere means? It would appear not. Rather, the state of being the property of another reduces me to mere means. This is distinguishing from the barista, as the barista is merely selling portion of their time, whereas the servant is selling their entirety. The barista is not owned by their employer for the length of their shift, the employer is merely entitled to that segment of the barista’s time.
One could plausibly object that the servant is simply selling their time as the barista is, just for a longer period of time; thus, they are not mere means. However, it would seem that there ought to be limits on how much of our time we may sell. In some sense, one must retain their autonomy despite selling a portion of their time or labour. The barista retains this autonomy by being free to leave the arrangement, whereas the servant is not.
Thus, it would seem as though we have arrived at a set of criteria that distinguish a means, from a mere means: acceptance, manners, and freedom of exit (from the contract we have accepted). What exactly these demand in practice is unclear; perhaps freedom of exit only obtains in cases where I am not restricted by my need to have money for survival. Perhaps manners consist merely in not being degrading, rather than being positively uplifting. These matters are beyond the purview of this post, however, it is important to note that what is means to treat someone not as a mere means may possibly be rather loose, in terms of obligations, or rather restricting. However, these criteria do appear to be necessary and sufficient conditions of doing so.
